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 3 
Introduction 
 
“Each of us has a voice. Each voice is distinct and has something to say. Each voice deserves 
to be heard. But it requires the act of listening.” 
 Terry Tempest Williams 
 
The world is an incredibly diverse place, in which voices need to be heard. Yet, especially in 
the past, out of fears of instability and the disaggregation of the state, many leaders have 
chosen to ignore that reality and have opted for the creation of one people within the state, 
ignoring the diverse voices in favor of one voice has not always resulted in the aspired 
stability. In fact, many of today’s civil wars are fed by fears of groups that their voices will 
remain unheard. Some leaders, interested in mitigating such conflict, in anticipation that 
ethnic conflict could become violent or in order to prevent a country from falling apart, have 
chosen to accept such diversity, by allowing these groups representation in central institutions 
as well as in some cases a greater amount of self-rule (McEwen and Lecours 2008; Simeon 
and Conway 2001; Suberu 2005; Yonatan 2008). 
 
These power-sharing arrangements in multiethnic contexts have not remained without 
controversy. Some argue that they can mitigate conflict and prevent a country from falling 
apart (Lijphart 2008; Gurr 2000; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Others however maintain that 
such arrangements are short-term solutions that in the long-term can create or maintain 
conflicts and, in cases where regional boundaries are drawn along ethnic lines, are more likely 
to result in either the disaggregation of the state or the recentralization of power (Rothchild 
and Roeder 2005; Roeder 2008). However, rather than drawing to rigorous conclusions about 
the benefits or not of such arrangements one argues that constitutional arrangements alone 
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cannot explain group behavior as each group exhibits distinct features influencing if, where 
and how voice is sought. 
 
Ethiopia is one such country that has officially recognized its ethnic-lingual diversity after a 
long history of ethnic conflict. Previously a unitary state, in 1994 it adopted a federalist state 
structure based on ethnic criteria as well as features that would allow its multiple “nations, 
nationalities and peoples” 1 (=ethnic groups) greater representation at the center (International 
Crisis Group 2009, 4; Art. 39; Ibid Art. 53). While up until the present day Ethiopia has not 
fallen apart, in the past 20 years the country has continued to experience non-violent calls 
(e.g. the Sidama in the SNNPr) for internal secession as well as violent calls for secession 
(e.g. Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-government conflict) (UCDP 2013).  
 
Such calls might be influenced by the institutional capacity of a certain region, or in some 
cases a lack thereof, as well as the constitutional design itself (e.g. Erk and Anderson 2008; 
McGarry and O’Leary 2005). For example, limited institutional capacity, severely hindering 
the implementation of policy designed at the regional level as well as the establishment of 
only a few sub-units, differing in size, could become a source of discontent and trigger calls 
for more autonomy (Van der Beken 2012, 186; Suberu 2005, 142). Yet these factors do not 
act independently of the societies for which they are meant to accommodate voice (Aalen 
2011, 3). 
 
Some research suggests that some social factors, i.e. language (e.g. McEwen and Lecours 
2008), education (Horowitz 1985) and the level of group concentration (Bakke 2010) might 
                                                
1 The 1994 Constitution defines “nations, nationalities and peoples” as “a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common 
culture, or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, and who predominantly inhabit an 
identifiable, contiguous territory” (Art. 39 § 5). According to the national census in 2007 the Oromos (34.5%), the Amhara (26,9%), the 
Somali (6.2%) and the Tigrayans (6.1%) form the biggest groups (CSA 2007).  
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influence the political behavior of groups. The central question of this thesis will therefore be: 
How do Language, Education and Territorial Concentration Influence the Seeking of Voice at 
the Center and/or at the Periphery? 
 
The research question will be posed in the specific context of the region of Benishangul-
Gumuz, one of Ethiopia’s regional states being an ethnically heterogeneous region also 
comprised of indigenous groups whose place of residence is predominantly confined to the 
respective territory. While Ethiopia has other heterogeneous regions such as the Southern 
Nations Nationalities and Peoples region (SNNPr) time constraints do not allow one to 
include this even more complex environment in the analysis. 
 
The thesis is divided into seven parts. In part one, one will give a brief historical overview of 
the country at study. The distinct history of the country will be divided in three sections, 
namely the Imperial Period, the Derg Period and the History under Ethnic Federalism. In part 
two one will elaborate on the concepts of voice at the center and voice at the periphery in 
general which will then be looked at in more detail in the Ethiopian context, constituting part 
three.  
 
In part four based on an assessment of the constitutional provisions as well as the Ethiopian 
historical background, one will then establish three central arguments.  
 
Firstly, it will be argued that the adoption of a single official language in a multilingual 
context leads to a setting where groups communicating in this language as mother tongue 
might be more capable of effective participation in the policy process, whereas non-native 
speaking groups might experience a competitive disadvantage in said participation. A second 
argument will be that weak provisions towards equitable group representation in institutions 
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may create an environment that promotes representation and appointments by merit, 
jeopardizing the prospects of groups with lower educational levels while favoring the 
empowerment of the higher educated groups. Lastly it will be argued that the expectations 
raised by the constitutional promise of self-rule may diverge fundamentally depending on 
how concentrated a group lives on the condition if said group exclusively controls its 
territory. Groups living regionally dispersed and/or sharing their territory might consider a 
greater group voice less desirable than a shared voice, which they may perceive as 
counterproductive for the inevitable cooperation between the groups sharing the territory. 
Conversely, groups living territorially concentrated within a region and also potentially 
controlling it, may perceive that self-rule has not materialized to a sufficient extent and would 
perhaps consider a greater group voice as their more desirable option.  
  
Turning now to part five, in this section one will elaborate on the methods of analysis, a 
qualitative case study based on literature available in English. In part six, the voice-seeking 
behavior of the groups over time will be assessed by testing a set of hypotheses established on 
the basis of the above arguments in the specific context of Benishangul-Gumuz.  
 
The discussion leads to the following conclusions, which are presented in part seven. Firstly, 
groups not speaking the official language as their mother tongue tend to concentrate their 
voice-seeking efforts in the periphery. Secondly, groups with lower educational levels appear 
to be more likely to demand proportionality in institutions not subject to guaranteed group 
representation, whereas higher educated groups tend to at least not support such demands. 
Finally, territorially concentrated groups controlling their own territory seem to be more 
likely to seek a greater group voice whilst more dispersed groups sharing their territory tend 
to refrain from doing so.  
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1. Brief Background 
Ethiopia’s documented history can be traced back more than two thousand years. Unlike other 
African states it has successfully warded off colonial attempts over the period of its existence. 
With 74 million people it is the second most populous country on the African continent. It is 
rich in cultural, lingual and religious diversity, currently comprising more than 85 ethnic 
groups -many of them with distinct languages2- and multiple religions and denominations3 
(Assefa 2012, 438). In order to understand the country’s present context it is useful to 
examine its history along these lines including also the development of its current territory 
and internal organization. 
 
Imperial Period 
Modern statehood in Ethiopia started with Emperor Tewodros who ruled the country from 
1855 to 1868. He introduced land reforms, built a national army and encouraged Amarigna, as 
opposed to Ge’ez -the old church and court language- as the official language. These first 
state-building efforts met rather strong resistance from the local landlords and the clergy, 
eventually resulting in the defeat of Emperor Tewodros’ forces in 1868 (Bahru 2001, 30-35). 
The following period under Emperor Yohannes IV from Tigray was marked by foreign 
interferences especially from European powers interested in colonizing the Horn of Africa 
(International Crisis Group 2009, 2). However, internal resistance in those years was less 
strong due to regional aristocrats enjoying a reasonable amount of autonomy as long as they 
accepted the emperor’s rule and paid their tributes on a regular basis (Bahru 2001, 43).  
 
                                                
2
 Oromigna with 33.8% is the most spoken language followed by Amarigna (Amarigna) spoken by 29.3% of the population (CSA 2007).  
3
 The Christian Orthodox form the biggest group with 43.5% followed by 33.9% Muslim, 18.6% Protestant, 2.6% indigenous beliefs and 
0.7% catholic (CSA 2007). 
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This changed to some extent under Menelik II, an Amhara, acceding the throne in 1889. 
Already as a Shawan ruler he had engaged in territorial expansion by conquering and 
incorporating territories to the south, east and west including Gojjam4, Oromo and Wolaita 
(Bahru 2001, 60-66). While the regional rulers that submitted peacefully and paid a fixed 
amount of taxes enjoyed some autonomy, most areas came under the jurisdiction of Menelik’s 
generals’, who settled in the respective areas and extracted surplus produce as well as surplus 
labor from the subjugated groups (Van der Beken 2012, 63; Bahru 2001, 87). Apart from 
expanding Ethiopia’s territory, Menelik II furthered the project of building a modern, 
centralized state. He established Addis Ababa as Ethiopia’s capital and built roads and 
electricity networks as well as schools (International Crisis Group 2009, 2). The defeat of the 
Italians in the battle of Adwa (1896) eventually resulted in the recognition of Ethiopia’s 
present day territorial boundaries (Bahru 2001, 84). 
 
Centralization and modernization continued under the brief rule of Menelik II’s grandson 
Iyasu who had succeeded him after his death in 1913 and under Haile Selassie, ruling the 
country from 1916 to 1974 first as a regent (1916-1930) and as an emperor (1930-1974)5 
(Asnake 2009, 55; International Crisis Group 2009, 2). Two of Haile Selassie’s contributions 
to the project of state building appeared to have been the introduction of the first written 
constitution in 1931, most probably in order to solidify his power6, and further strengthening 
Ethiopia’s national army (Asnake 2009, 56; International Crisis Group 2009, 2). Haile 
Selassie also engaged in the project of national assimilation to the Amharic culture, religion 
(Christian Orthodoxy) and language. This went as far as only offering education in Amarigna, 
prohibiting publications in Oromigna and Tigrigna and making Christian Orthodoxy the state 
                                                
4 Part of Gojjam currently comprises the Metekel zone in the Benishangul-Gumuz region (Bahru 2001, 86). 
5 Between 1936 and 1941 Italy occupied Ethiopia. This forced Haile Selassie to temporarily leave the country. However, he returned when 
the Italians where defeated in 1941 (Asnake 2009, 56). 
6 According to Asnake (2009, 56) the constitution neither provided for popular representation nor civil liberties. 
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religion. As a result other languages and religions were marginalized. However, while certain 
groups enjoyed more autonomy and other groups7 were given special land rights, group 
affiliation per se did not play such a major role. The regime apparently believed that anyone 
could acquire political as well as economic power once the dominant culture of the country 
had been adopted, meaning, in essence, giving up one’s identity (Asnake 2009, 60, 61; 
Clapham 1988, 195; Van der Beken 2012, 64, 71). 
 
In 1952 Eritrea joined Ethiopia to form a United Nation’s sanctioned federation. The 
respective federal arrangement only lasted ten years. Eritrea’s relatively liberal constitution 
did not fit nicely with Ethiopia’s highly centralized authoritarian rule. This resulted in 
Eritrea’s eventual subjugation to Ethiopia’s central rule in 1962 (Asnake 2009, 56).   
 
The 1960’s were marked with increased resistance to Ethiopia’s central power. Eritrea 
embarked on a secessionist war. Radicalized students, heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist 
and Maoist ideologies8 fought for the land to be distributed more equally9 and for groups’ 
rights to self-determination. Furthermore, peasants from Tigray (north), Bale (south-east) and 
Goyam (north-west) who felt economically exploited engaged in a rebellion against the 
residing ruling elite (Bahru 2001, 215-226). The regime’s incapability to respond to the 
demands for change, and possibly the 1973 famine leading to 40,000-80,000 deaths10, 
eventually resulted in a popular rebellion, which enabled a group of mutinous military officers 
                                                
7 These groups were primarily Northern Soldiers or soldiers with Amhara identity as well as Priests of the Orthodox Church, groups crucial 
to the regime’s establishment of power. This effectively made the inhabitants of the respective territories tenants of these new landlords and 
had resulted in severe economic exploitation (Asnake 2009, 61; Van der Beken 2012, 64). 
 
8 Some groups mobilized on the basis of class cleavages (e.g. Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party) and others on the basis of national 
inequalities (e.g. the later Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)) (Asnake 2009, 62). 
9 The used slogan was „land to the tiller“ (Asnake 2009, 56). 
10 The famine appeared to have mainly hit the Oromo and Afar tenants (De Waal 1991, 59, 60). 
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to remove the ruling elite from power in 1974 (Clapham 1988, 32; International Crisis Group 
2009, 3; De Waal 1991, 58, 59). 
 
Derg Period 
In 1974 the Derg, a socialist-military regime under the leadership of Mengistu Haile Mariam, 
rose to power. One of its first efforts to clean Ethiopia from leftovers of the previous regime 
was the nationalization of land and its redistribution to kebeles (peasants’ associations). 
However, these peasants’ associations had limited freedom. Their main task was 
administering the land according to centrally defined guidelines (Asnake 2009, 56; 
International Crisis Group 2009, 3). The Derg’s National Democratic Revolution Program 
(1976) also promised the equality of national groups and some form of regional autonomy “in 
the spirit of socialism” (Asnake 2009, 64; Clapham 1988, 199). This promise failed to 
materialize as will be elaborated on further down. 
 
From the beginning, continued political unrest plagued the country. Within its boundaries 
students, mainly represented by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRF), 
demanding democratic elections, engaged in assassination campaigns against prominent Derg 
members and supporters. In a counter offensive in 1976, after having solidified his power 
within the Derg, Mengistu Haile Mariam started to employ what later became known as “the 
red terror”, i.e., the arrest, torture and execution of tens of thousands EPRF supporters and 
other presumed state enemies. In addition, groups including the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) as well the Tigray People’s Liberation 
Front (TPLF)11 engaged in independence struggles. Even though the Derg heavily fought 
                                                
11 The TPLF was found in 1975 by Tigrayan students who mobilized support for their struggle among the peasantry of their home region 
(Aalen 2011, 33). 
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against the respective groups, it appeared to have been incapable to contain these struggles. 
Finally, Ethiopia also fell victim to external aggression. In 1977 Somalia invaded the Somali 
inhabited regions of Ethiopia in an attempt to seize the respective territory. However, Ethiopia 
successfully warded off the aggressors, also due to its external military support from Russia 
and Cuba (Van der Beken 2012, 89). 
 
In 1983 the Derg set up an institute that engaged in studying the distribution and socio-
economic condition of Ethiopia’s different nationalities. The institute was also mandated with 
advising on the proper state structure that would make regional autonomy based on 
nationality possible. However, the result codified in its constitution in 1987 did not give equal 
powers to all regions. Some regions affected by insurgency gained autonomy12 while the 
remaining territory was simply divided into 25 small administrative regions with fewer 
powers. In addition, the continuation of the centralization of power and the missing 
recognition of working languages other than Amarigna highly questioned the intent of the 
ruling elite (Asnake 2009, 64). Thus, in practice the promise of group equality and regional 
autonomy seems to have failed to materialize. 
 
The famine that hit Northern Ethiopia between 1983 and 1985 apparently killing more than 
400’000 people, the regime’s policy of “villagization” (resettling farmers into centrally 
planned villages) and forced resettlement to government-designated areas caused great 
animosity among the affected population. This might have played into the hands of the 
resistance forces (De Waal 1991, 5, 231). Between 1989 and 1990 finally both the TPLF and 
EPLF made important military advances, apparently forcing Mengistu to flee the country in 
1991 (Van der Beken 2012, 103). 
                                                
12 Eritrea, Tigray, Dire Dawa, Ogaden and Assab all enjoyed autonomy and Eritrea enjoyed most autonomy (Asnake 2009, 64). 
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The Period of Ethnic Federalism 
Already before the end of the war, in anticipation of future leadership, the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF) had set up the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF), a coalition between itself, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) 
representing the Amhara, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO)13 and in 
1994 also the Southern Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF). From the beginning 
TPLF appeared to have been the most dominant element in the coalition (International Crisis 
Group 2009, 4; Aalen 2011, 33, 34). 
 
In 1991 the EPRDF organized a transitional national conference inviting the participants, 
mainly ethnicity-based opposition groups, to create a provisional transitional charter. Arguing 
that the previous ignorance of Ethiopian diversity only resulted in wars and fuelled 
nationalism, Meles Zenawi, the later prime minister, strongly supported a new state structure 
based on ethnicity14. The charter was thus not only to guarantee fundamental human rights, a 
multi-party system, the right of freedom of speech and association but also the right to 
national self-determination (up to secession) as well as the establishment of local and regional 
ethnicity-based councils. In addition it provided for Eritrea to secede (Lyons 1996, 124; 
Asnake 2009, 57). 
 
Shortly after, the national conference formed the Council of Representatives (CoR) and 
established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The outcome was what some 
                                                
13 This party was set up by the TPLF itself. At large, its membership appeared to have consisted of former Derg prisoners of war 
(International Crisis Group 2009, 4). 
14 This was probably not the only reason. As Aalen (2011, 36) argues, the new state structure also enabled the new ruling elite to maintain 
control of the state apparatus. 
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might term asymmetrical. Within the CoR the EPRDF controlled 32 seats of 78 seats and the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), second in line, received twelve seats (International Crisis 
Group 2009, 4). One to three seats were awarded to each of the rest of the 30 political 
organizations (Asnake 2009, 57). In addition, the EPRDF assumed fundamental positions 
within the new executive including the position of president taken up by Meles Zenawi.  
 
Finally, pan-Ethiopian parties like the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the 
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), the latter mainly representing the urban 
elite, were excluded from participating in the TGE supposedly because they seemed to have 
refused to refrain from violence but perhaps also because the EPRDF did not tolerate parties 
that did not share its view on ethnically defined citizenship (Young 1996, 537; Asnake 2009, 
57; International Crisis Group 2009, 4). Indeed, not all parties appeared to have supported the 
EPRDF’s policies fearing it would result in ethnic fragmentation and the breaking apart of the 
state. Two presumed additional reasons for such opposition were also that some groups live 
territorially dispersed -thus ethnic self-determination had little appeal to some of them- and 
that by providing for broad ethnic representation in central institutions, some that had 
previously enjoyed a competitive advantage (e.g. Amhara) probably lost out (Van der Beken 
2012, 118).  
 
The highly questionable regional and local elections in 199215 having taken place after the 
division of the state in 12 administrative regions and two chartered cities, contributed to the 
suspicion that governance would not be based on inclusiveness. In fact, after having 
boycotted the election on the grounds that not all parties had enjoyed an equal playing field, 
                                                
15 It was alleged that EPRDF had sponsored allies including the OPDO while simultaneously engaging in the intimidation of the opposition 
and fraud. This resulted in some opposition parties boycotting the elections (Young 1996, 537; Joireman 1997, 399; Lyons 1996, 127). 
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the OLF left the transitional government and gave up its seats in the Council of 
Representatives (CoR) (Asnake 2009, 57; Van der Beken 2012, 119). 
 
After the 1992 elections the EPRDF started to establish new parties and regional 
administrations that were in line with its objectives. On several occasions the opposition tried 
to influence the transition by working to form opposition coalitions as well as trying to 
convince the TGE to create a new transitional government. By 1994 it became apparent that 
all attempts had failed, inter alia due to the increasingly powerful position of the EPRDF. The 
boycott of the 1994 constituent assembly elections by major opposition parties managed to 
secure the EPRDF a landslide victory (Lyons 1996, 129). 
 
In 1994 the constitutional assembly, dominated by the EPRDF and its affiliates, adopted a 
new constitution acknowledging the right to self-determination of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups, 
including secession. It also provided for the appreciation of human and political rights. 
Moreover, it divided the country in 9 federal states along ethno/linguistic lines16 and later two 
city-states17. It also mandated a bicameral parliament, the indirectly elected House of 
Federation (HoF) representing Ethiopian ethnic groups and a directly elected House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR) representing Ethiopian people as a whole (Asnake 2009, 
57). Finally, the constitution provided for a strong prime minister as the head of government 
and a president with a largely ceremonial role (Van der Beken 2012, 134).  
 
While to some extent empowering previously marginalized groups, one of the immediate 
effects of putting such a strong emphasis on ethnicity is the deprivation of a voice of possibly 
millions of Ethiopians identifying themselves more as national Ethiopians as opposed to 
                                                
16 Tigray, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Gambella, Harari, Amhara, Oromia and Somali 
17 Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa 
 15 
members of their assigned ethnic group (Asnake 2009, 82). Moreover, as Yonatan (2008, 424, 
425) formulates it, ”ethnicity becomes the sole lexicon of political discourse“, a tool for 
ethnic entrepreneurs“ to gain access to power. Consequently, one might imply that in order to 
gain representation, individuals that had previously identified with a more overarching 
identity were almost forced to identify with a specific ethnic group. Similarly many parties 
that seemed to have previously mobilized more broadly now came to represent only one 
ethnic group. For instance, in 1994 the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) 
came to represent the Amhara people under a new name, the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM) (Asnake 2009, 70).  
 
Whilst Ethiopia has not experienced another civil war, the country has not remained free of 
conflict. From 1998 to 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea fought an interstate war, originally triggered 
by a border dispute. In addition, low-level conflict has continued to take place between certain 
groups, i.e. the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF), and the EPRDF government. Finally, various conflicts within groups, between groups 
and between regions keep on plaguing the country (UCDP 2013).  
 
Several elections since the adoption of the constitution have raised suspicions about the 
regime’s intent to allow other parties challenge its dominant position. From 1995 opposition 
parties intended to present themselves at regional as well national elections yet up to the 2005 
elections they were apparently severely hindered to do so due to the EPRDF favoring 
affiliates, harassment, intimidation and imprisonment of their candidates and supporters 
(Lyons 1996, 142; Aalen 2011, 49). 
 
The 2005 parliamentary elections, with parties having participated for the first time in a 
relatively competitive manner, the opposition, though not winning a majority in the federal or 
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regional parliaments, managed to win a relatively great number of seats. However the 
electoral outcome was not mutually accepted. In fact, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy 
(CUD), a non-ethnic party coalition that had won 109 out of 545 seats in the federal 
parliament decided to refuse to take up its seats in the federal parliament, in an attempt to 
deny the elections their legitimacy. This however, left them with no option to oppose the 
EPRDF in the federal assembly (Van der Beken 2012, 140, 142). These developments were 
paralleled by post-electoral protests violently suppressed by government forces (Abbink 
2006,186). The amendment of a number of laws after the elections, effectively transferring 
Addis Ababa city council authority to the federal government escalated the conflict. It 
resulted in fatalities, the destruction of property and arrests of members of the opposition18 as 
well as countrywide arrests of suspected opposition supporters (Assefa 2012, 461; Abbink 
2006, 192).  
 
From 2005 onwards, the EPRDF appeared to have used a carrot and stick approach to 
increase its party membership. Furthermore, in the subsequent elections its supporters also 
used harassment and intimidation as tools to prevent opposition parties from registration or to 
force them to withdraw. Finally, the National Electoral Board employed tactics of deliberate 
confusion of voters19. These maneuvers resulted in the incumbent party and its affiliates 
winning both the 2008 local elections as well as the 2010 regional and national elections 
almost without competition (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008, 113; Tronvoll 2010, 1, 10). 
 
                                                
18 Of the opposition the targeted party was the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), a pan-Ethiopian party mainly representing the 
urban middle class (Abbink 2006, 181, 182). The CUD had won the Addis Ababa city council elections but as part of its protest refused to 
occupy the won seats in both the city council and the parliament (Assefa 2012, 461). 
 
19 The National Electoral Board would for example give the party name and license of opposition parties to minor splinter parties friendly to 
the government (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008, 113). 
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After having set the stage, for the purpose of this thesis, one will now turn to the concepts of a 
voice at the center and a voice at the periphery central to this study. 
2. Concepts 
Generally speaking a voice refers to either participation in central institutions and/or having a 
certain amount of self-rule. A voice at the center could offer aggrieved groups the opportunity 
to express their specific group concerns and increase the chance that the resulting policy 
output will, at least to some extent, devote attention to their interests (McEwen and Lecours 
2008, 225). Conversely, a voice at the periphery –which some believe is particularly 
appropriate for territorially concentrated groups- would allow groups to address their 
concerns at the lowest level and protect their interests from being overruled by the majority 
(e.g. Simeon and Conway 2001; Watts 1996; Gurr 2000).  
 
Concept “Voice at the center” 
Central voice provisions include the proportional allocation of ministerial posts amongst all 
relevant groups or the attribution of influential cabinet positions to the aggrieved groups, 
reserving a specific number of seats in the first chamber of parliament, representation in a 
second chamber20 as well quotas or at least a constitutionally recognized objective of 
inclusive representation in central institutions such as the military and the judiciary (Rothchild 
and Roeder 2005, 32, 35; Lijphart 2008, 82, 84). A group veto in areas of vital importance 
(e.g. language) could make sure that central decisions would not have a disproportionally 
negative effect on minority groups (Lijphart 2008, 49).  
 
                                                
20 The latter is a common feature in federations to protect local interests (Van der Beken 2012, 43). 
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In linguistically diverse societies, the adoption of official bi-/multilingualism is another 
measure that might allow a greater voice at the center (McRae 1998, 32). Apart from 
facilitating the admittance to positions in the civil service sector (McRae 1998, 22), the 
measure of official bi-/multilingualism -where groups can do both, read official documents 
and express their interests in their own language- might allow groups to participate more 
effectively in the policy process. 
 
Concept “Voice at the Periphery” 
One way of allowing a greater voice at the periphery is the establishment of a federal political 
system, i.e. a system in which sovereignty is shared between the center and its constituent 
units, is expressed through the division of powers between the two levels and is safeguarded 
by a rigid constitution. Usually, the responsibilities devolved to regional sub-units include 
legislative, administrative and financial powers on “local issues” such as education, culture, 
social welfare, law and order and in some cases economic development. Conversely, issues 
concerning the state as a whole, including foreign affairs, the functioning of the economic 
union and major tax powers, remain at the center (Watts 1996, 7, 36, 40, 41; McEwen and 
Lecours 2008, 226). 
 
Before assessing the central question, the above generic concepts need to be translated into 
the mechanisms for voicing group interests in Ethiopia. 
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3. The Ethiopian Context 
Mechanisms of Voice in Ethiopia 
As indicated in the country’s historical account, Ethiopia adopted its new constitution 
acknowledging Ethiopia’s diversity in 1994. But contrary to other contexts in which a voice at 
the center is initially given in response to an identified systematic discrimination, and a voice 
at the periphery is yielded in reaction to claims of self-determination (Kymlicka 2005, 147, 
148), with the adoption of the Ethiopian Constitution all groups attained such rights.  
 
In fact, the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution promises all of Ethiopia’s “nations, nationalities and 
peoples” the right to a “full measure of self-government” and “the right to establish 
institutions of government” in its inhabited territory (Art. 39 § 3). It also allows representation 
in central institutions. How this formally translates will now be outlined. 
 
Voice at the Center 
Ethiopia’s constitution first and foremost offers politically recognized ethnic groups a voice at 
the center through a second chamber, the House of Federation (HoF). It is made up of 
indirectly elected representatives of ethnic groups whereby each ethnic group can present at 
least one representative and gets an additional representative for each additional million of its 
population (Art. 61§ 2)21 (Van der Beken 2007, 110, 111). Formally members of the HoF are 
not meant to act as regional representatives. Indeed, they primarily speak on behalf of their 
group. Yet due to the fact that regional actors elect them, they have to some extent become 
agents representing regions (Yonatan 2008, 454).  
                                                
21 While the Harari for instance, having a population size of only a few thousand have one representative at the HoF the Oromo exhibiting 
Ethiopia’s largest territorial group with approximately 25 million have 19 representatives (Yonatan 2008, 452; CSA 2007). 
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The HoF only has a limited legislative role in that it can initiate and approve constitutional 
amendments (Art. 104; Art. 105). In addition, it determines the areas where the federal 
government may enact civil law22 (Art. 55 § 6). However, due to the lack of a veto on laws 
passed by the legislative body (including law passed in culture or education, for example) and 
decisions taken by the executive body, the influence of the HoF to protect group interests 
might be limited (Aalen 2011, 45). 
 
A further function given to the HoF is the power of constitutional interpretation, a function 
usually performed by an independent court. In this undertaking it gets assistance from the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry, staffed with legal experts (Art. 62§ 1; Van der Beken 2007, 
111, 112). It also decides on issues concerning the groups’ right to self-determination, 
including secession, mediates between groups when disputes arise (e.g. border disputes) (Art. 
62 § 3; Art. 62 § 6) and authorizes federal intervention should the constitutional order be 
endangered (Art. 62 § 9). Furthermore the HoF also enjoys the responsibility to divide the 
income from joint tax sources (Art. 62 § 7), including the development of a formula to 
determine on what basis federal subsidies are to be allocated to federal sub-units (Yonatan 
2008, 460, 461; Asnake 2009, 245, 246). Thus, the HoF to some extent gives Ethiopia’s 
politically recognized groups a voice in the policy process. However, since seat allocation is 
also based on group size, smaller groups might become less strongly empowered than larger 
groups.  
 
Another mechanism where specific group concerns can be voiced at the center, is through 
representation in the federal government. Equitable ethnic representation is constitutionally 
                                                
22 The federal government may only enact civil law where it is essential to „sustain and establish one economic unity“ (55 § 6). In all other 
areas civil-law making resides with the federal sub-units (Yonatan 2008, 495). 
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mandated, an arrangement that also extends to other institutions such as the armed forces (Art. 
39 § 3; Art. 87 § 1). These provisions however are rather vague. Nevertheless, this issue 
seems to have been given some attention. While after the 2005 elections key positions were 
still controlled by individuals from the Tigray region23, it appears that the federal cabinet was 
made up of 11 different ethnic groups (Yonatan 2008, 466; see also Van der Beken 2007, 
111).  
 
A further provision in the Ethiopian Constitution that allows ethnic diversity is guaranteed 
representation for minority groups in the federal parliament, i.e. 20 seats of a total of 550 
seats in parliament are reserved for “minority nationalities and peoples” (Art. 54 § 4). While it 
is not clear which groups constitute a minority, some suggest that in practice it seems that 
such a right is given to groups with a population size of lower than 100,000 (e.g. Aalen 2011, 
44). This provision thus specifically serves small and/or dispersed ethnic groups who may not 
be able to gain a majority in an electoral district24 and therefore run the risk of not being 
represented in the federal parliament (Van der Beken 2007, 109).  
 
The last mechanism that might allow a voice at the center to the different ethnic groups is the 
aspect of official bi-/multilingualism. Such a measure is not present at the center as, despite 
Ethiopia’s multilingual context, the official language is Amarigna (Art. 5 § 2). As language is 
one of the variables assumed to influence the voice-seeking behavior of groups, this issue will 
be further elaborated on hereinafter. 
                                                
23 The current Prime Minister Ethiopia having taken over after the former PM’s (Meles) death comes from the Wolayta district of the 
SNNPr (Durame 2013). Thus there might be a change occurring. 
24 In Ethiopia seats are won by gaining a majority in an electoral district (first-pass-the-post electoral system) (54 § 3). 
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Voice at the Periphery 
The Ethiopian Constitution does not only provide for central group representation but also for 
a voice at the periphery. In other words, while areas affecting the Ethiopians as a whole 
remain within the auspices of the state, the Ethiopian Constitution grants states extensive 
executive, legislative and judicial powers not only on issues concerning identity but also on 
other more local issues. 
 
Although federal sub-units have the right to decide on a large number of issues, the following 
powers remain under central control. According to the constitution powers in areas including 
foreign affairs, defense, currency and monetary policy and criminal law fall under the 
auspices of the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPR), the first chamber of parliament 
(Yonatan 2008, 432). Furthermore, since the state owns all land and other resources (40 § 3), 
the use of natural resources, such as land, rivers and lakes between federal sub-units, remain 
under central control (ibid). Finally, the center may levy and collect taxes on, amongst others, 
corporations and property it owns and raise fees relating to import and export (Art. 96; Van 
der Beken 2012, 186, 187). 
 
Apart from determining their own working language (Art. 5 § 3), regions may enact and 
execute their own constitutions, social and economic development policy, draw up their own 
budget, establish and regulate civil service and police as well as administer land and natural 
resources according to central guidelines (Art. 52). Furthermore, while the federal 
government sets guidelines for issues relating to identity (Art. 51 § 3), the regions appear to 
have reasonable room for maneuvering. They are at large, not only entitled to enact their own 
civil law (Art. 52 § 2) but seem to also be allowed to exercise powers in such areas as 
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education and broadcasting. Apart from these identity related competences regional states 
regulate, amongst others, agriculture and state roads (Yonatan 2008, 434, 435). Finally, the 
regions also have some powers to generate their own revenue by raising taxes on the income 
of state- and private- business employees, on the earnings of farmers and on corporations they 
own (Art. 97). 
 
Thus, as opposed to the Derg period it appears that groups have gained a significantly greater 
voice at the center and the Constitution now provides for regional self-rule. In particular in 
matters concerning identity there appears to be rather extensive autonomy.  
 
However, constitutional arrangements alone cannot explain group behavior as each group 
exhibits distinct features influencing if, where and how voice is sought. In particular the 
factors of language, education and the level of group concentration might influence the voice-
seeking behavior of groups. Based on found literature, one will now proceed to discuss some 
of the constitutional provisions in the light of the central question of how these factors 
influence the seeking of voice at the center and/or at the periphery. 
 
4. Central Arguments and Hypotheses 
As conceptualized, group voice is seen as participation in central/regional institutions as a 
means to influence policy output. It thus requires –beyond mere group representation- the 
ability of constituents to understand the documents and express their interests in an effective 
way. 
 
This leads to the first issue to be discussed, namely the social reality that in Ethiopia multiple 
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languages are spoken interacting with the constitutional adoption of Amarigna as the single 
official language (Art. 5 § 2). Apart from possibly experiencing a disadvantage in gaining 
civil service appointments (Dereje 2009, 644), groups that are non-native Amarigna speakers 
may be faced with a competitive disadvantage when participating in the policy process, and 
their interests might remain unheard. Also, in the case that some are proficient in Amarigna it 
might result in the empowerment of individuals –bilinguals and, as Amarigna used to be the 
language of instruction, the educated- but not groups (McEwen and Lecours 2008, 226). Said 
individuals do not necessarily speak in the name of their group. In other words, the issue of 
language might seriously hinder group empowerment at the center. In this context one would 
expect that groups, seeking a language environment in which they are capable to compete 
(Horowitz 1985, 241), are more likely to strive for more influence at the periphery. 
  
H1 Groups that are non-native Amarigna speakers are more likely to seek influence at the 
regional level. 
 
Next to the language issue, the second social aspect, which is likely to influence the groups’ 
voice-seeking behavior is the disparate educational levels of groups interacting with the 
constitutional provision of only a broad objective towards equitable group representation in 
certain central institutions. With such a provision that leaves room to choose amongst the 
most qualified individuals from those groups, groups that are on average less well educated, 
might not gain the promised voice in central-, and if such weak provisions are also part of 
regional constitutions, regional institutions. The result could be a possible unequal 
empowerment of groups. Thus, in Horowitz’s (1985, 224) terms groups that are less well 
educated might seek proportional representation and “if they have an exclusionary claim, 
more than proportional representation” in these institutions. Conversely, groups that are better 
educated only seek non-discrimination in such appointments, preferring the appointment to 
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positions according to educational rather than ethnic criteria (ibid, 224). 
  
H2 Groups with lower educational levels are more likely to seek at least proportional group 
representation in central/ regional institutions not subject to guaranteed group representation. 
H3 Groups with higher educational levels are more likely to oppose proportional group 
representation in institutions not subject to guaranteed group representation.  
 
A further argument deals with territorial concentration interacting with the constitutional 
promise of group self-rule (Art. 39 § 3). The Constitution promises all groups self-
government and even recognizes that some states are multiethnic; it specifically names for 
example the region of Benishangul-Gumuz after two ethnic groups (47 § 1). Yet in practice 
not all eighty-five ethnic groups enjoy the same amount of self-rule as only nine sub-state 
units were established. This implies that in the more heterogeneous regions some groups have 
to share their voice on issues directly affecting them. However, this does not necessarily result 
in groups seeking a greater group voice at the periphery. 
  
As could be derived from the historical account of the country, not all groups seem to live 
confined within a certain territory (Van der Beken 2012, 118). Under such a condition, if a 
large part of one group resides in different parts of the region more autonomy might still 
result in them having to share their voice with other groups. Thus retaining or even increasing 
their voice at the regional level by cooperation with other groups might be seen as more 
beneficial than more territorial autonomy. However, cooperation with other groups might 
necessitate the moderation of the seeking of representation in the name of the group since this 
may potentially alienate groups with whom they might choose to cooperate (Bakke 2010, 99).  
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At this point one has to challenge the assumption that each group controls its own territory, 
which makes autonomy a desirable option. If a territorial sub-unit is controlled by more than 
one group with territorial rights, autonomy might not yield the aspired greater group voice, 
since it would –just like a territorially dispersed group- still have to share territorial control. 
Thus for both, a dispersed group or a group not in sole control of its own territory, one would 
expect a greater willingness to cooperate with the other groups in the region instead of 
aspiring for a greater group voice. 
 
Conversely, where groups live highly concentrated in a territory and would be in potential 
control of said territory more autonomy would be an alternative. In Bakke’s (2010, 99) words, 
these groups might be more likely to play the “ethnic card” or make more group specific 
demands (Bakke 2010, 99). Thus, if a group fulfils both conditions, territorial concentration 
and potential exclusive control of the territory, it might demand a greater group voice at the 
regional level and alternatively seek more autonomy, due to a possible perception that self-
rule has not materialized to a sufficient extent.  
 
H4 Groups that live concentrated within a territory and are in sole control of that territory are 
more likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery. 
H5 Groups that do not live concentrated within a territory and are not in sole control of that 
territory are less likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery. 
 
Based on the assessment of the Ethiopian Constitution and the historical context, one might 
deduce that the selected societal factors of language, educational levels, territorial 
concentration might be determining factors of where and how voice is sought. 
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Before continuing with elaborating on the methods of analysis one needs to also consider 
three further factors that might also affect political behavior, in particular voice-seeking, as a 
means to provide alternative explanations for the analysis. 
 
These are party patronage (the power of the ruling party to appoint individuals to office) 
kinship ties across group boundaries as well as identity as a means to gain political 
representation (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008, 356; Erk and Anderson 2010, 8). One will first 
consider the aspect of party patronage. As has been previously mentioned, after the fall of the 
Derg regime the TPLF has been active in all regions in either establishing parties as part of 
the EPRDF or creating affiliates in the remaining regions. Informally these parties are not 
accountable to the electorate but to advisers placed in all regions. This means that regional 
officials and administrators have little room for maneuvering given they want to keep their 
appointments (Aalen 2011, 46). Party patronage may drive individuals as well as groups to 
generally draw more towards the center. Thus, this aspect will certainly have to be taken into 
account when analyzing the question at hand in the specific context of Benishangul-Gumuz. 
 
The second factor possibly influencing the voice-seeking behavior of groups is kinship ties 
with groups living in neighboring territories (Erk and Anderson 2010, 8). Especially if the 
respective groups perceive themselves as being discriminated against, the wish to secede -thus 
seeking a greater voice at the periphery- to join their kin in another state or sub-state unit can 
be rather strong. This could for example be observed with the Majangir in Ethiopia’s 
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples region (SNNPr) (Vaughan 2003, 272). However, 
while this aspect might influence voice seeking under particular conditions, not all groups 
have such ties across state or sub-state boundaries. In addition, as Horowitz (1985, 229) 
argues, the wish to join kin might be tempered if it means that the group would be included in 
an even “less desirable state”. 
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A third alternative explanation for possibly not seeking specific group rights could be that 
groups might not exhibit the strong identity one assumes. In other words, as initially stated in 
the historical account of the country, some individuals initially with a more pan-Ethiopian 
identity, might identify with a certain group for mere instrumental reason, i.e. to gain 
representation in central/regional institutions. Thus, as opposed to individuals identifying 
more strongly with their group -when being represented in central/regional institutions- they 
might show a more cooperative attitude and might be less likely to make group-specific 
demands. 
 
To round up the discussion one wants to make one additional point. One does not assume that 
groups are always united in their interests, i.e. while part of a group might want a greater 
voice at the periphery, another part might see no additional benefits in doing so. Also, 
individuals of the groups that enjoy representation in central as well as regional institutions 
might not necessarily speak in the name of their group. However, for the sake of simplicity 
one will for now keep to the above hypotheses and add some complexity if needed at a later 
stage. 
5. Methods, Case Selection, Data and Measurement 
Research Method 
In this thesis a qualitative case study method is applied, examining the voice seeking behavior 
of groups over time. Hancké (2009, 61) points out that case studies have the advantage that 
they allow a “detailed insight into mechanisms, motives of actors, and constraints they face at 
particular moments which no other, statistics, experiment, biographies, or even more 
systematic comparative analysis—can offer“. On the downturn they are not generalizable. 
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However, the insight gained from this analysis might serve to establish future large-N studies 
(Hancké 2009, 61).  
 
Case Selection 
The hypotheses will be tested in the region of Benishangul-Gumuz, an ethnically 
heterogeneous region also comprised of groups whose place of residence is predominantly 
confined to the respective territory. In fact amongst the largest indigenous groups comprising 
the region 88% of the Gumuz, 94% of the Berta and 96% of the Shinasha total population 
resides in Benishangul-Gumuz. Focusing on one region only allows one to control for region 
specific constitutional provisions. While Ethiopia has other heterogeneous regions such as the 
Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples region (SNNPr) time constraints do not allow one 
to test the hypotheses in this even more complex environment. Although the behavior of other 
groups will certainly have an impact on the group behavior of the analyzed groups, as it is 
assumed that they have the greatest political leverage, the research will be predominantly 
confined to the above-mentioned largest indigenous groups. Data of other groups (non-
indigenous groups, smaller groups) will only be included where it serves the purpose of 
assessing the question at hand. 
 
Data Collection and Limits 
Due to the limits of not being able to collect data directly and not being able to read the 
country’s language, the data is collected from secondary sources written in English 
predominantly comprised of published articles, journals, books and government sources such 
as central/regional census data. Since some of the data is in some cases not or no longer 
available, one is also forced to use unpublished work and Internet sources other than 
governmental websites. In addition one needs to point out other difficulties. Since quantitative 
 30 
data is scarce, one also had to rely on qualitative data. Also, regarding the issue of language 
one was unable to find data on possible bilingualism. 
 
As pointed out above, in this study one examines group behavior over time with the research 
predominantly focusing on the period between 1991 and 2005. The reason for the choice of 
the year 2005 as the end of the analyzed time period resides in the lack of available material 
on the behavior of the analyzed groups. 
 
Measurement 
One will first consider the independent variables language, educational levels, territorial 
concentration as well as the variable of previous autonomy. Firstly, the variable language will 
be measured quantitatively by comparing the number of group members with the number of 
possibly corresponding mother tongue speakers. Secondly, the variable educational levels will 
be assessed qualitatively and categorized into ”relatively low“ or ”relatively high“. Next, the 
territorial concentration will again be measured quantitatively as a percentage of group 
members residing in one single zone, a territorial unit one level bellow the regional level. 
Furthermore will consider if the group shares the control of said territory with another group. 
 
One will now turn to the measurement of the dependent variables, i.e. seeking influence at the 
regional level, seeking proportionality and seeking a greater group voice. All variables will be 
determined on the basis of qualitative data. The first variable seeking regional influence is 
assessed indirectly by the presence or absence of group calls for greater representation in 
central institutions (e.g. quotas in central institutions, more representation in the House of 
Representatives (HoF)). Next, the variable seeking proportionality will be determined by calls 
for representation according to relative indigenous group size. Furthermore, the variable of 
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seeking a greater group voice will be assessed by the presence or absence of group calls for 
representation on the basis of ethnicity including the seeking of more autonomy.  
 
After having discussed how the analysis will be conducted one will now turn to the specific 
context of Benishangul-Gumuz starting with outlining the background of the region. 
 
6. Benishangul-Gumuz 
Brief background of the Region 
The area of present day Benishangul-Gumuz was incorporated into Ethiopia during Menelik’s 
eastward expansion and became one region in 1993 through the merger of two regions i.e. 
former Metekel and Assosa (Asnake 2009, 160; Van der Beken 2007, 125). It comprises an 
area of 50’380 km2 and has a population size of only 670’847, thus a low population density. 
It borders Amhara in the north and north-east, Oromia to the east, to south it shares a 
boundary with Gambella and to the West with Sudan (Van der Beken 2007, 125). The region 
is inhabited by five indigenous groups, i.e. the Berta (26%), the Gumuz (21%), the Shinasha 
(8%), the Mao (2%) and the Komo (1%). Furthermore, it has a large population of non-
indigenous groups with the Amharas (19%) and the Oromos (12%) constituting the largest 
non-indigenous groups in the region. This condition had resulted from resettlement actions by 
the Derg regime on the one hand and more recent migration for reasons including the 
availability of land (Van der Beken 2007; Asnake 2009, 120; CSA 2007).  
 
The people inhabiting the region are predominantly engaged in traditional cropping. Due to its 
general underdevelopment, for example the region lacking modern industries and commercial 
farming; apart from a few relatively wealthy urban inhabitants, most of the people are rather 
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poor (Young 1999, 336, 339). Finally, Young (1999, 336) points out that, in the early years of 
the federation, among the adult population only 15% could read and write, illustrating the 
generally low literacy level in Benishangul-Gumuz. 
 
Having set the stage, one will now turn to a brief outline of the three largest groups’ (Berta, 
Gumuz, Shinasha) historical background, and the region’s political developments up to 1991. 
 
Historical Background Analyzed Groups/ Political Developments up to 1991  
Historical Background Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha 
The first group to be assessed, the Berta, can broadly be divided in two different groups, the 
Witawit Berta and the pure Berta (Asnake 2009, 118).  Traditionally the Witawit Berta had 
made up the ruling elite within the Berta group. During the first part of the imperial period, 
amongst the Witawit-Berta Sheik Khojale of Assosa seemed to have played the most 
prominent role in Benishangul. At the time of the incorporation of the three sheikdoms Bela 
Shangul, Assosa and Komosha, he had submitted peacefully to Menelik’s troops and had 
delivered important intelligence to crush the resistance from the other sheiks (Bahru 2001, 66, 
68). While the control over the sheikdoms was eventually returned to the conquered ruling 
elites, Sheik Khojale, due to his strong linkages with the center became the ruler of the three 
sheikdoms in 1914. This initial autonomy of the Witawit Berta elites had come with a high 
price for the pure Berta. In order to pay their tributes to the emperor, the Witawit Berta raided 
the lower class pure Berta and other groups for slaves. They also used pure Berta slave labor 
to extract regional resources such as gold and ivory. After Sheik Khojale’s death, his 
descendants lost that voice at the regional level yet received representation at the sub-regional 
and district level. This limited autonomy, however, came to an abrupt end when the Derg rose 
to power. The new regime removed the traditional leaders from their positions and 
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dispossessed them of their land. As a consequence, the Berta and their territory came under 
direct rule of the center (Asnake 2009, 118, 128, 129; Abbink 2011, 514). 
 
Turning now to the Gumuz, up until the beginning of the 20th century they were victims of 
the slave trade run by Sudan and the highland Ethiopians. Moreover, the migration of the 
Oromo from the south over the Blue Nile forced them to resettle in their current inhospitable 
territory. These sustained hardships inflicted by their over-powerful neighbors and the harsh 
land they inhabit shaped the Gumuz’ identity and their relationship within their ethnic group 
as well as with the ethnicities surrounding them (Asnake 2009, 119). As for the group’s 
relationship with the center, dominated by the Amhara and Tigray highlanders, it can be 
summed up by one of “raiding, slaving and retreat” (ibid, 126). The Gumuz endured a more 
difficult incorporation into the Empire than the Bertha. After the group’s defeat by King 
Teklechaimanot of Gojam in 1898, conflicts with the Agaw endured until the 1940’s, due to 
continued Agaw slave raiding, their campaigns for dominance and their settlement drive. The 
Gumuz with their inferior military capabilities had no choice but to retreat even further into 
the inhospitable lowlands. Occasional attempts to oppose this encroachment and violent 
retributions from the central government intensified the local conflict between the lowland 
Gumuz and their highland neighbors (ibid, 127). The Derg’s resettlement policy from 1974 
onwards, migrating thousands of people into the Metekel region, without regard of the impact 
on the local Gumuz, forced them even further out to the periphery. Only with the forming of 
the Benishangul-Gumuz region, the Gumuz becoming the second largest indigenous group, 
did their position improve (Ibid, 128).  
 
The last group to be addressed are the Shinasha who -like the Gumuz- had suffered from slave 
raids from the Ethiopian highlands from the 16th century on as well as from forced 
resettlement into the arid and hostile lowlands of the Metekel region (Asnake 2009, 119, 120). 
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Competition for land and the pressure from their dominant neighbors lead to conflict with the 
Gumuz. The Shinasha also assimilated with the Oromo settlers in order to ward off the threats 
from the Agaw and Amhara. Only in the 1980’s was the relationship between the Shinasha 
and the Gumuz strengthened as they recognized the large amount of migrants resettled into 
their territory by the Derg as a common threat to their livelihood (Ibid, 121). 
 
Political Developments up to 1991 
The Derg regime bloodily suppressed emerging opposition from groups within Benishangul 
at the end of the 1970’s, the few survivors escaping to Khartoum to raise support for their 
cause (Young 1999, 327). This resulted in the founding in the late 1980’s of the region’s first 
political organization to oppose the Derg regime, the Benishangul People’s Liberation 
Movement (BPLM). It was mainly composed of Berta, although some Gumuz participated as 
well. From the beginning the BPLM struggled with forming a united front. For its actions to 
have a meaningful impact, it initially sought support from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). 
However, in order to attain OLF support the BPLM should have accepted the OLF’s claim 
over the territory it intended to liberate. While emerging BPLM leaders rejected this claim, 
part of the group appeared to have been more willing to make concessions. This resulted in 
divisions within the political movement (Asnake 2009, 159).  
 
Voice Seeking up to 1991 
During the Imperial Period, the Witawit Berta, especially Sheik Khojale of Assosa and his 
followers appeared to have had both the regional political power and the economic power to 
remain relatively autonomous. While Sheik Khojale seemed to have entertained strong links 
to the center, no documented evidence was found that the Witawit Berta as a group aspired to 
a stronger voice in the Amhara dominated center. Already during the imperial period and later 
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under the Derg regime, the Witawit Berta seemed to have gradually lost their voice at the 
periphery. The first uprisings in the 1970’s as well as the establishment of the Benishangul 
People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM) in the 1980’s with a low (Gumuz) to absent 
participation by other groups implies that the opposition to the Derg probably came from 
individuals of the group that had previously lost their voice: the Witawit Berta. The BPLM’s 
alliance seeking behavior with the OLF appeared to have been mostly for instrumental 
reasons, with the ultimate goal of Berta self-rule in Benishangul after the conflict, and not a 
shared rule with Oromo interference. This represents a strong call for a voice at the periphery 
of the respective group members, aiming to reclaim their predominant position in the region.  
 
The pure Berta, Gumuz and Shinasha appeared to have been the marginalized groups 
probably deprived of any rights, subjugated and slave raided. In contrast to the formerly 
ruling Witawit Berta, the marginalized groups, lacking any previous experience of autonomy, 
appeared to not have been capable to capitalize on previously held political power. It is 
furthermore interesting to note that amongst the indigenous underprivileged groups, only the 
Shinasha seemed to have contemplated the option to assimilate with the Oromo settlers when 
under threat from the highlanders. This fact is of interest for the discussion of the Shinasha’s 
voice seeking behavior in later periods. 
 
The apparent lack of an active role of at least the Gumuz and the Shinasha in the opposition 
initiatives against the socialist regime might imply that up until the fall of the Derg regime 
said groups neither possessed, nor attempt to gain political empowerment, be it at the 
periphery or at the center. 
  
The above findings from the political developments up until 1991 did not pertain to the voice 
accommodation under the political structure of ethnic federalism. However, they might shed 
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light on the motivations and the initial position of the groups under discussion at the point of 
adoption of the federal state structure.  
 
Turning Point 
The institutionalization of the ethnic federal system proves to be the turning point, since it 
represents the first time that the previously marginalized groups became constitutionally 
rightful owners of their inhabited territory and were accorded a minimum representation at the 
center as well as at the periphery. It was also the first time said groups were granted the 
constitutional rights to influence policy directly affecting them as a group. 
 
Voice mechanisms 
In 1994 the region adopted its first constitution allowing a voice to the previously 
marginalized groups by making the Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, the Mao and Komo the owners 
of their region (Van der Beken 2012, 265). Whilst the regional constitution does not include 
measures for guaranteed executive group representation, and provides for Amarigna as the 
working language, there appeared to have been some informal power sharing within the 
regional executive (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 Composition Regional Cabinet 2005 
 
Source: Van der Beken 2007, 127 
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In contrast to the executive, in the regional parliament all indigenous groups have guaranteed 
representation. Moreover the numerically smaller groups actually enjoy overrepresentation 
with respect to their population size (Van der Beken 2012, 256; Young 1999, 335). In 
addition to the above measures, since 2002 the Constitution provides for a Constitutional 
Interpretation Commission with similar functions as the House of Federation (HoF). Contrary 
to the HoF seats are distributed equally among the groups with each indigenous ethnic group 
having the right to four seats. Yet, as of 2005 the establishment of this institution had not yet 
happened (Van der Beken 2007, 127, 128). 
 
The region is administratively divided in three zones (Assosa, Metekel, Kemashi) and two 
special weredas (Mao-Komo, Pawe) (Van der Beken 2012, 253). Before 2002 ethnic groups 
did not have territorial rights. However, under the new constitution they would have the right 
to establish, within regional boundaries, their own territories (zones) with self-administration- 
as well as cultural rights (ibid, 130). Nevertheless, as of 2009 this measure has not been 
implemented, also due to the circumstance that some groups live territorially dispersed 
(Asnake 2009, 167). 
 
As opposed to the Derg period the previously marginalized groups thus gained representation 
not only in the center but also in the periphery. Yet a specific provision for political 
representation of non-indigenous groups is not provided for. In fact, also due to an electoral 
law that mandated the knowledge of the regional/zonal language in which the candidates 
intended to run for public office non-indigenous groups are seriously underrepresented, the 
region’s political institutions (Young 1999, 335; Asnake 2009, 174, 175).  
 
Having briefly laid out the historical background of the groups and the regional constitutional 
voice provisions, the analyzed groups will be assessed in more detail with particular focus on 
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the selected voice-seeking influencing factors of language, education as well as group 
concentration. 
 
Language, Education and Territorial Concentration  
Considering first the variable of language, as initially argued, being a native speaker of the 
constitutionally adopted language is not only a means to gain access to positions that are not 
subject to guaranteed representation, it is also a means to effectively participate in the policy 
process. One will therefore proceed with evaluating this variable. 
 
The 2007 census reveals that Bertagna as a mother tongue is spoken by 25% of the population 
followed by Amarigna (22%), Gumuzigna (21%), Oromigna (17%), Shinashigna (5%) and 
other languages that constitute less than 5%. The following tables illustrate the results from 
the assessment of the social variable of usage of Amarigna as a mother tongue. 
 
Table 1  
Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) > 1000:  
Assosa Urban 
Table 2  
Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) >1000:  
Metekel Urban 
 
Table 3  
Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) > 1000: 
Metekel Rural 
 
 
  
 
In most zones mother tongue seems to correspond relatively tightly with the number of ethnic 
group members (see tables 6, 7, 8, Appendix 1) yet, there are some peculiarities in the Assosa 
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urban centers and in the Metekel zone. In Assosa amongst the groups that constitute more 
than 1000 people there appear to be more Amarigna mother tongue speakers than Amhara 
group members25. Conversely, other groups show that some group members (Berta, Guragie, 
Tigrie) probably do not identify the corresponding language as their mother tongue (table 1). 
A similar yet probably more emphasized picture can be observed in the Metekel zone. In 
urban centers Amarigna, as a first language, seems to be spoken also by groups other than the 
Amhara (table 2), and among the rural population Oromigna constitutes the mother tongue of 
more than just the group (table 3) (BGNRS 2007). An interesting observation might be that in 
comparison to other groups, especially the Shinasha appear to identify their corresponding 
language much less frequently as their mother tongue with tables 2 and 3 showing a possible 
correspondence with Oromigna as a mother tongue within the Shinasha rural population as 
well as, while less clear, Amarigna within the urban population26. In the case that the said 
individuals also have the relevant educational background, they might be more eligible for 
appointment to merit-based positions and they may also be capable of more effective 
participation in the central and regional parliament. However, one must acknowledge that said 
native Amarigna speaking Shinasha constitute at the most about 3 % (maximum 2’000 out of 
60’000) of the total Shinasha population, thus in this context one could not talk of 
empowerment of the group as a whole. Thus none of the three analyzed groups seems to 
speak the central and regional official language as a mother tongue.  
 
Apart from language, with the constitutionally weak provisions for group representation in the 
central/regional executive as well as other non-parliamentary institutions, educational levels 
                                                
25 Other groups and their languages were taken into account when setting up the tables, yet because of their small group size they are not 
shown here. 
26 This observation might indicate some intermixture through marriages or ethnic conversion as it has been observed in the Gambella region 
between the Anywaa and Nuer ethnic groups (Dereje 2009, 642) or, in the case of the Shinasha, their historical assimilation to the Oromo to 
protect themselves from the Amhara and Agew (see above).  
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might be an important factor to gain group representation. Additionally, with the 
constitutional promise of self-rule, the level of group concentration may be an important 
factor to demand said right of self-rule. Thus at this point it is necessary to assess said factors 
including representation within civil service as well as the historical background of the 
groups, compiled in the following table for the reader’s convenience. 
 
Table 4 Language, Education, Territorial Concentration, Civil Service Appointments, Historical Background  
Groups Berta Gumuz Shinasha Non-indigenous 
Amhara 
Non-indigenous 
Oromo 
Historical 
background: 
Imperial period 
 
  
Witawit Berta: 
Regional ruling 
group, land-owners 
and slave raiders 
Pure Berta: 
Subject to slave 
raiding 
 
Forced 
resettlement to 
inhospitable 
lowlands and 
subject to slave 
raiding  
Forced 
resettlement to 
inhospitable 
lowlands and 
subject to slave 
raiding, 
assimilated to 
Oromo 
Not ruling group 
but powerful 
neighbor 
Central ruling 
group, 
economically 
advantaged 
Historical 
background: 
Derg Period 
Subject to Central 
Power 
Subject to 
Central Power 
Subject to 
Central Power 
Settlers Settlers 
Political Power 
after 1991 
Political 
representation 
regional/central 
Political 
representation 
regional/central 
Political 
representation 
regional/central 
First no 
representation 
then limited 
representation 
First no 
representation 
then limited 
representation 
Mother Tongue Predominantly 
Bertagna 
 
Predominantly 
Gumuzigna 
Shinashigna, 
possibly 
Amarigna in 
Metekel urban 
areas and 
Oromigna in 
Metekel rural 
areas 
Predominantly 
Oromigna 
Predominantly 
Amarigna 
Educational 
levels 1990’s 
Relatively low Relatively low  Relatively high  No direct data on 
settlers, probably 
relatively high 
among skilled 
migrants 
No direct data on 
settlers, probably 
relatively high 
among skilled 
migrants 
Zonal 
Concentration % 
of Groups 
93 Assosa 62 Metekel 
37 Kemashi 
98 Metekel 43 Assosa 
28 Metekel 
11 Kemashi 
29 Assosa 
30 Metekel 
24 Kemashi 
% Of total civil 
service positions 
(2005) 
7.5 4.5 No Data, 
presumably a 
majority of the 
remaining 20% 
28 40 
Data compiled from Asnake 2009; Young 1999; Van der Beken 2012; BGNRS 2007  
 
 
Elaborating on the results of table 4 one will now compare the groups within Benishangul-
Gumuz on the basis of the potentially influential social factors. Considering the historical 
background, to understand from where each group came from at the turning point, one can 
say that during the Imperial Period, a feudal rule of the Witawit sub-group of the Berta 
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probably made them the only advantaged indigenous group of the region whereas the other 
ethnic groups, as well as the pure Berta, probably seemed to not have had a voice. During the 
Derg period, these groups appeared to have become more equal; the Witawit-Berta losing 
their supremacy to the central Derg regime and all indigenous groups faced with centrally 
enforced resettlements (Asnake 2009, 121,128, 172). With the regime change, the indigenous 
groups acquired political rights also in the region, allowing them some influence on their fate, 
with the settlers initially having no political rights (Asnake 2009, 172). Given the choice of 
Amarigna as the administrative language in the federal/regional center (Van der Beken 2012, 
258), the Amhara settlers, as well as individuals from the other groups using Amarigna as a 
mother tongue, might have improved their chances of access to positions not subject to 
guaranteed representation. With respect to the factor of education levels, the Shinasha seemed 
to have been the most advanced group amongst the indigenous groups, and with Amarigna 
being used as the language of instruction, may have resulted in greater Amarigna proficiency 
(Young 1999, 341, 342). Unfortunately, no data could be found on the educational attainment 
of the settlers, but one assumes that the personnel hired from other parts of the country in 
order to strengthen the region’s institutional capacity -also including Amharas and Oromos- 
exhibited higher levels of education (ibid, 338).  
 
As for the zonal concentration, the Berta display a very high concentration within the Assosa 
zone. The Shinasha are also residing highly concentrated within one single zone, however, it 
is noted that they share the Metekel zone as a minority with the Gumuz. The latter live split 
between two zones. 
 
Civil service is clearly dominated in numbers by the non-indigenous groups. The analyzed 
indigenous groups’ representation in civil service needs to be assessed in the context of the 
demographic distribution within the zone. The Berta making up the 26% of the region’s 
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population, only provide 7.5% of the bureaucratic workforce and the Gumuz constituting 21% 
of the population, were awarded 4.5% of the civil service appointments. Both said groups are 
clearly underrepresented. While no explicit numbers of Shinasha civil servants could be 
found, with the region having a preference for indigenous personnel (Young 1985, 338), it 
can be assumed that a substantial part of the remaining 20% of civil service positions were 
awarded to the Shinasha as third largest titular group making up 8% of the regional 
population. Thus it appears that the Shinasha were about proportionally represented if not 
even slightly over-represented.  
 
After having elaborated on the variables of language, education and territorial concentration, 
including also the historical background of the groups and the percentages of civil service 
appointments, one will now turn to giving an outline of the political developments from 1991 
to 2005.  
 
Political Developments between 1991 and 2005 
After the fall of the regime, the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM)  
appeared to have been accepted as the main political force in the area. The party attended the 
Addis Ababa conference and was represented in the unelected interim assembly, the Council 
of Representatives (CoR) (Asnake 2009, 160), which resulted in a temporary BPLM 
dominance in the region (Young 1999, 328). This dominance however, proved difficult to 
sustain. In 1992 the party split as part of the Gumuz left to establish their own party: the 
Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM). Concurrently, other groups, including the 
Shinasha, also set up their own ethnicity-based parties (Asnake 2009, 160).  
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Upon the merger of the regions, differences emerged between the Gumuz and the Berta about 
who was to occupy the regional presidency and where the regional capital was to be located. 
It was eventually agreed that the Berta would name the president and the new capital would 
be Pawe, located in the Gumuz zone of Metekel. Thus, the Berta received the most powerful 
voice at the periphery (Asnake 2009, 160). 
 
The first government was established under the leadership of a newly formed party coalition 
dominated by the BPLM. The latter’s dominance seemed to have also resulted from support 
of the EPRDF, the central ruling party. However, the BPLM was unable to play its dominant 
role due to rivalries within the party (Ibid, 160, 161).  
 
With the BPLM’s different factions’ inability to come to terms with one another and as a 
consequence, in order to offer a certain level of political stability, the EPRDF undertook a 
restructuring of the region’s political landscape in 1995; all parties had to remove radical 
(Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Sudan sympathizers) as well as corrupt elements from 
among their midst and were forced to adopt clear political objectives. This purging resulted in 
the exclusion of a number of political actors and the establishment of pure ethnic parties (ibid, 
162, 249).  
 
As a result, the BPLM came to represent the Berta as the Ethiopian Berta People’s 
Democratic Organization (EBPDO), and the Mao and Komo who already had their ethnic 
parties, were merged into a new party, the Mao-Komo People’s Democratic Organization 
(MKPDO). In addition, all ethnicity-based parties were united under one umbrella 
organization: the Benishangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF). Finally, 
after the 1995 elections, the regional presidency was given to a Gumuz, Yaregal Aysheshim 
(ibid).  
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Thus, the Berta lost their most powerful voice at the periphery, said loss apparently not being 
perceived very well. However, the assurance by the federal government that in the future this 
presidency would alternate between them and the Gumuz seemed to have appeased the Berta 
political class as, in the period following the event, the region experienced a reasonable 
amount of political stability (ibid, 162).  
 
In 2000, regional and federal elections were poorly contested, with the new coalition, an 
EPRDF affiliate, winning 71 out of 80 seats27 in the regional council and six seats in the 
federal parliament, with no additional seats won by other regional groups (Yehizib 2000). As 
a result, the different ethnic groups had to find procedures to accommodate the interests of the 
different ethnic coalition partners. This resulted in the Berta demanding the offices of regional 
presidency and secretary, inter alia, on the grounds that it had been the main actor in the 
independence struggle. In contrast, the Gumuz argued that the regional council should elect 
the individuals to the respective offices by majority vote (Asnake 2009, 163). 
 
The reelection of a Gumuz member as the president of the region resulted in the Berta 
withdrawing for nine months from political participation at all levels of the region and 
demanding an own ethnicity-based region to allow for self-administration as well as the 
development of their own culture and language (Ibid, 163, 164).  
 
While initially this quest for an own region had enjoyed popular support, it eventually 
dwindled, with part of the Ethiopian Berta People’s Democratic Organization (EBPDO) 
deciding to side with and join the regional government because of disagreements within the 
                                                
27 The rest of the seats went to independents. See African Elections Data Base http://africanelections.tripod.com/et_2000state.html. 
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group (Ibid, 164).  In reaction to the demand for an own region, the EPRDF, not in favor of 
creating a new region, appeared to have first dismissed the demand as not in the interest of the 
Benishangul-Gumuz population. However, in order to smoothen the situation, it once again 
demanded the parties to cleanse themselves of dissidents (Gimgema) and referred the issue to 
the HoF (Ibid). The Berta thus received a chance to voice their grievances.  
 
These included that they felt underrepresented in all regional institutions, in comparison with 
such groups as the Shinasha, who had been able to put forward more qualified personnel, 
occupied more positions within the executive in relation to their group size. They were further 
aggrieved due to perceived disadvantages in the allocation of centrally provided training 
opportunities as well as foreign scholarships. Thus, apart from proportional representation and 
resource allocation, the Berta also demanded the limiting of representation of smaller groups 
and non-indigenous groups to the wereda level along with a demand for the proportional 
allocation of bureau head positions (Asnake 2009, 165; Young 1999, 341).  
 
These demands were only partially met. Within the regional assembly the Berta emerged as a 
majority, yet the Shinasha actually gained in representation28. Within the executive, the Berta 
and the Gumuz received four and three positions respectively and the other groups, the 
Shinasha, Mao, Komo as well as the non-indigenous groups, all received one seat. No 
proportional assignments of bureau heads were adopted since the HoF apparently followed 
the line of argumentation of the Gumuz dominated regional government that merit, not only 
ethnicity, should be the basis of appointments. For the positions of the regional presidency, 
vice-presidency and chairman of the regional ruling party the two majority groups decided on 
a compromise that if one group comes to occupy the presidency the other is to receive the two 
                                                
28 The Berta gained 5%, the Gumuz lost 9%, the Shinasha gained 3.5% and the Mao-Komo remained the same with two seats each (Asnake 
2009, 164). 
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latter positions. In the 2005 regional elections the Ethiopian Berta People’s Democratic 
Organization (EBPDO) appeared to have run as a single ethnic party yet obtained only one of 
99 seats29. After those elections, despite having closely followed party guidelines, the Berta 
political class failed to obtain the seat of presidency once more and a year later part of the 
Berta resumed the struggle for ethnic self-determination30 (ibid, 166, 167).  
 
The above political developments should not be seen as independent of other processes that 
took place concurrently. In 1992/93 tensions rose between the indigenous groups and settlers, 
both in Metekel and Assosa, the settlers voiced demands to be granted political 
representation, having been deprived of such a right in the new political context (Ibid, 169).  
 
While the Metekel settlers, due to central ruling party intervention, were apparently granted 
limited representation in the regional parliament and the executive, the Assosa settlers’ 
attempts to gain representation seemed to have been met with more successful opposition 
(Ibid).  
 
In a bid to counter this political marginalization, the settlers approached both the regional as 
well as the federal government, and were eventually granted 12 of 100 seats in the regional 
parliament, much to the discontent of the Berta political class. The settler’s candidacy was 
however nullified when Berta party officials filed a complaint that the candidates had no 
knowledge of the zonal language, a necessity to run for office according to a proclamation 
issued earlier by the electoral board (Ibid, 169, 170).  
 
                                                
29 11 Seats also went to the CUD, a non-ethnic party see http://africanelections.tripod.com/et_2005state.html. 
30 GSN, “Ethiopian Governments Sign Peace Accords With Benishangul’s Rebel Group,“ Gambella Star News, 19 August 2012. 
http://www.gambellastarnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=997:ethiopian-govt-signs-peace-accord-with-
benishanguls-rebel-group-&catid=1:latest&Itemid=426 (Accessed 23 April 2012). 
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The decision to cancel the settlers’ candidacy not only faced opposition from the settlers 
themselves but also from the other ethnic parties within the regional coalition, including the 
regional president, Yaregal Aysheshim. The latter saw this decision as endangering the 
region’s stability and demanded federal institutions, including the House of Federation (HoF), 
to look into the matter (ibid, 170, 171).  
 
Since Amarigna is used as the working language of the region, the House of Federation (HoF) 
finally decided that settlers should be allowed to stand as candidates. From 2005 onwards, the 
settlers were allowed to run for nine seats in the regional assembly. The right to be elected for 
the federal parliament was denied (ibid, 171, 176).  
 
Having described the political developments in Benishangul-Gumuz with particular 
consideration of the voice seeking behavior of the respective groups, these results will now be 
assessed based on an eventual causal relationship between the voice seeking behavior and the 
previously discussed disparities of specific social factors. 
 
Discussion 
At the onset of this thesis, the aim was to understand groups’ voice seeking behavior within a 
federal state structure. One has therefore posed the question of how the social factors of 
language, education and group concentration influence the seeking of voice at the center 
and/or at the periphery.  
 
The analysis of the Ethiopian constitution as well as the country’s distinct history yielded six 
hypotheses, namely: groups that are non-native Amarigna speakers are more likely to seek 
influence at the regional level (H1); groups with lower educational levels are more likely to 
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seek at least proportional group representation in central/ regional institutions not subject to 
guaranteed group representation (H2); groups with higher educational levels are more likely 
to oppose proportional group representation in institutions not subject to guaranteed group 
representation (H3); groups that live concentrated within a territory and are in sole control of 
that territory are more likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery (H4); groups that 
do not live concentrated within a territory and are not in sole control of that territory are less 
likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery (H5).  
 
Analyzing the specific context of Benishangul-Gumuz, two broad observations can be 
discerned. Firstly, the previous account did not yield any evidence for groups attempting to 
increase their representation in central institutions. Secondly, while the Berta, or a faction 
thereof, repeatedly voiced group specific demands for more influence in the region, the 
Gumuz and the Shinasha appeared to have shown a greater willingness to cooperate with 
other groups in the region. In order to understand the voice seeking behavior of the analyzed 
groups one will now proceed to discuss said behaviors in the light of the established 
hypotheses. 
  
Initially one has assumed that not being an Amarigna mother tongue speaker might be -apart 
from a competitive disadvantage in gaining access to civil service positions- an obstacle to 
participating effectively in the central institutions. Thus increasing representation at the center 
might not render the desired result of effective influence on policy output. Therefore groups 
not in possession of said language might strive for more influence at the periphery. Of the 
analyzed groups only a small number of Shinasha, presumed to be partially native Amarigna 
speakers, might have been in the position where demanding more representation at the center 
would have allowed them to effectively voice group interests and influence policy output. 
However, no evidence is available of an attempt by the Shinasha as a group to seek a greater 
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voice at the center. Based on the available material, it seems that the all groups, not having 
Amarigna as a mother tongue, exhibited the expected behavior (H1) of focusing their voice 
seeking efforts on the regional level.  
 
For the sake of completeness, notwithstanding the above hypothesis, it is interesting to 
discuss at this point, that while having the possibility to seek a greater central influence, the 
Amarigna speaking faction of the Shinasha appear not to have chosen to seize that 
opportunity. One possible reason for them not seeking greater representation at the center 
might have been that they seem to have relatively high educational levels allowing access to 
positions not subject to guaranteed representation thus, their voice might have been perceived 
as having been accommodated to a sufficient extent. However, a more likely reason is their 
relative group size, an assumption initially not taken into account, combined with the fact that 
most of the Shinasha reside in Benishangul-Gumuz. As Horowitz (1985, 37) points out, very 
small groups, if territorially concentrated, might focus their efforts on the lowest level 
possible that promises success, which in the case of the Shinasha with their relatively high 
educational levels might have been the regional level.  
 
Since none of the groups appeared to have sought increased representation at the center one 
will now turn to their specific voice seeking-behavior in the region, starting with the voice 
seeking behavior of the largest indigenous group in the region. 
  
The Berta as a group or, in all likelihood one faction thereof, appeared to have repeatedly 
voiced group demands for a greater voice at the periphery. These include their aspirations for 
the presidency on the basis of a perceived group entitlement, their demand for the 
proportional allocation of executive/bureau head positions, their attempt to keep the settlers 
from representation as well as on two occasions, their demand for an own region. This 
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behavior appears to be in line with the behavior of a group who perceives its voice -due to a 
perceived alternative- to be insufficiently accommodated in the new regional voice-sharing 
arrangement. Since the Berta seem to live highly concentrated in one territory and constitute 
the indigenous majority in said territory the making of such demands might confirm 
hypothesis four (H4). 
 
Turning now to the their specific demands one will first consider their demand for the 
proportional allocation of executive/bureau head positions. A possible reason for these 
demands might have been that their educational levels did not correspond to the regional 
preference for skilled and qualified personnel for said positions. Their specific voice seeking 
behavior might be in line with the hypothesis (H2) that groups, on average less well educated, 
are more likely to seek at least proportional representation in institutions not subject to 
guaranteed group representation. 
 
As for their fierce opposition to the settlers’ aspirations to gain political representation, a 
possible inference one could draw from their behavior is that -apart from trying to preserve 
their group representation at the periphery- they might have feared a competitive disadvantage 
in effective participation against the non-indigenous representatives at least partially with 
Amarigna as a mother tongue. Indeed the Berta’s demand that the settlers had to speak the 
language of the zone in which they intended to run for office strongly implies that the Berta 
anticipated such competitive disadvantage. This might conform at least to some extent to the 
underlying reason for hypothesis one (H1); that groups seek a language environment in which 
they are capable to compete.  
 
After part of their demands had failed to materialize, especially to gain the presidency, they 
had demanded their own region allowing them to administer themselves and develop their 
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own culture and language. This appears to correspond to the hypothesis (H4); that groups 
exhibiting high territorial concentration and at the same time are in sole control of said 
territory are more likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery. 
 
Regarding the social variable of possible kinship ties as an alternative explanation for seeking 
more autonomy, from the above account -the EPRDF’s demanding to clear the parties of 
Sudanese/Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) sympathizers- it cannot be completely excluded that 
some ties across state boundaries might have influenced the Berta faction’s demand for more 
autonomy. Yet, as it has been shown in the historical account of the Berta People’s Liberation 
Movement’s (BPLM) struggle for self-determination, it seems that such ties appeared to have 
been used for their instrumental value, i.e. in order to regain their lost power in the region, 
rather than with the intent of joining another state, e.g. Sudan or Oromia.  
 
After having elaborated on the specific voice-seeking behavior of the Berta, one will now turn 
to analyzing the broadly observed voice-seeking behavior of the second largest group of the 
region, the Gumuz. Overall, based on the material found, their behavior seems to point to the 
direction of a preference for cooperation within the region, i.e. they appeared to have 
refrained from seeking a greater group voice at the periphery, a priori possibly confirming the 
fifth hypothesis (H5), that groups that live not concentrated within a territory or are not in sole 
control of their territory are less likely to seek a greater group voice at the periphery. On the 
contrary, they seemed to have opposed the Berta’s demand to keep the settlers from 
representation in the region and, at least their president elect, appeared to have opposed the 
allocation of bureau head appointments on the basis of ethnicity rather than merit. In addition 
they seemed to have never aimed at gaining more autonomy. Arguably the gaining of the 
presidency in 1995 and managing to keep it for three consecutive terms might be seen as 
seeking a greater group voice. Yet, their argument that the regional president should be 
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elected by majority vote when the Berta demanded the presidency strongly implies that they 
were willing to risk the most powerful voice in the region to allow cooperation with other 
groups. 
 
Turning now to the elaboration of their specific regional voice-seeking behaviors, one will 
first consider their opposition to the allocation of bureau head positions on the basis of 
proportionality. The Gumuz seem to exhibit on average equally low levels of education as the 
Berta and with regard to civil service appointments in 2005, they appeared to have been less 
advantaged. This should have been an incentive to join ranks with the Berta in their call for a 
proportional allocation of bureau head positions.  However, they -or at least their president 
elect- seemed to have supported the appointment to those positions also on the basis of merit. 
In fact, in 1997 it appeared to have been their president who had decided to improve 
institutional capacity by employing individuals from outside the region, arguing that 
indigenous bureau heads were not capable of fulfilling their job requirements (Young 1999, 
338). In this respect the hypothesis (H2) that groups that are on average less well educated 
seek proportionality in said institution seems not to be confirmed. 
 
On the other hand, assessing this behavior with regard to the Gumuz’ regional dispersion, one 
would, according to the fifth hypothesis, expect them to moderate their demands for group 
representation (H5). Considering that one of the groups -the Shinasha- with whom they 
appeared to have chosen to cooperate seemed to have exhibited higher educational levels, 
demanding proportionality would have put said smaller group in a disadvantaged position, 
possibly hindering mutual cooperation. In addition, the Gumuz -or at least their president 
elect- might have acknowledged the fact that having a functioning bureaucracy run by higher 
skilled personnel -allowing proper implementation of regional decisions- is more 
advantageous for all groups comprising the region than the group interest of proportional 
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representation. In other words, a voice is only effective if decisions are implemented. Thus, it 
appears that their lack of territorial concentration seemed to have had predominance in them 
opposing proportionality in the allocation of bureau head positions. 
 
The second voice-seeking behavior one could discern from the available literature is the 
Gumuz’ opposition towards the Berta’s demand to keep the settlers from acquiring at least a 
limited amount of political representation. As with the Berta, the Gumuz predominantly speak 
their corresponding mother tongue. Thus, according to the argument of retaining a 
competitive advantage in participating in the policy process, one should have expected, as 
with the Berta, that they would have been opposed to said representation. Yet the Gumuz -or 
at least their president- appeared to have been willing to make concessions. This appears to go 
against the initial expectation of the underlying reason for hypothesis one (H1), that groups 
seek a language environment in which they are capable to compete. 
  
In this respect it is necessary to note that the president appeared to have had concerns that the 
region might become unstable. Instability would probably have seriously hindered the 
implementation of policy designed at the regional level, which might have not only been 
against their interests but against the regional groups’ interest in general. Thus, one could 
argue that the Gumuz’ willingness to surrender part of their voice, thus making some 
concessions was probably seen as more advantageous than fully retaining both their group 
representation at the regional level and a competitive language environment. In the light that 
they live territorial dispersed and share one of their territories with the Shinasha their behavior 
seems to reconfirm hypothesis five (H5). 
  
After having discussed the Gumuz’ specific voice seeking behavior one will now turn to the 
last group, the Shinasha. The limited amount of material yielded no explicit voice seeking 
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behaviors. However, under close scrutiny, indirect evidence could be discovered, implying 
that similar to the Gumuz, the Shinasha might have shown a greater willingness to share their 
voice within the region, since they -like the Gumuz- do not have exclusive control of their 
territory. They appeared have made no group-specific demands, meaning that they at least did 
not join the Berta in both, their demand for the proportional allocation of bureau head 
positions on the basis of proportionally and the keeping the settlers from gaining political 
representation. Also, no evidence could be found of them demanding their own territory. 
Since the Shinasha -even though living predominantly in one zone- sharing a territory with 
the Gumuz this behavior might confirm hypothesis five (H5) that such groups are less likely 
to seek a greater group voice at the periphery. 
 
As with regard to not joining the Berta in their call for the proportional allocation of bureau 
head positions, in view of the Shinasha’s higher educational levels and them being a relatively 
smaller group, their behavior implies an attempt to keep their competitive advantage in terms 
of the appointment to said positions and in extension their relatively greater influence in the 
region. This behavior may be in line with hypothesis three (H3) that groups being on average 
more educated are more likely to oppose proportional allocation to said positions.  
 
Turning now to their implied opposition to keep the settlers from representation in regional 
institutions, one assumed reason for such a behavior may have been their possible better 
control of Amarigna, allowing them -even in the eventual loss of some representation- to still 
participate relatively effectively in the policy process. Another explanation, initially not taken 
into account, is their partial assimilation to non-indigenous groups. As seen in the historical 
account of the groups, the Shinasha seemed to have only set up their own party after the 
Gumuz had left the Berta dominated Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM). In 
reality possibly exhibiting a more pan-regional identity, in the new political context, 
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individuals comprising the group perhaps only indentified with their ethnicity where 
beneficial for their political representation. The circumstance of partial assimilation may have 
resulted in them having to keep own kin from representation not beneficial to these 
individual’s interests. Finally, as with the Gumuz, regional stability, allowing the 
implementation of policy, might have been seen as more beneficial than excluding the settlers 
from representation. This would appear to be in line with the fifth hypothesis (H5), that the 
Shinasha sharing a zone with the Gumuz are less likely to seek a greater group voice at the 
periphery and on the contrary might display a more cooperative behavior. 
 
After having discussed the behavior of the Shinasha one needs to discuss the alternative 
explanation of party patronage. The interest in keeping powerful positions might have 
encouraged at least the Gumuz to be more willing to cooperate within the common 
framework. Yet, as has been seen with (part of) the Berta, this condition has not prevented 
them from making more group specific demands. Thus, while party patronage might have 
played a role in some groups being more cooperative, and might have also prevented the 
Berta from acting with a united voice, the above analysis appeared to have revealed that party 
patronage as a sole variable cannot explain the behavior of the groups. 
 
For the reader’s convenience, the findings of the above discussion are summarized in a 
tabular overview. 
Table 5: Recapitulation of the Discussion 
Nr. Hypothesis Berta Gumuz Shinasha 
H1 Groups that are non-native Amarigna speakers are 
more likely to seek influence at the regional level 
confirmed confirmed confirmed 
H2 Groups with lower educational levels are more 
likely to seek at least proportional group 
representation in central/ regional institutions not 
subject to guaranteed group representation  
confirmed rejected; H5 
takes 
precedence 
 
n/a 
H3 Groups with higher educational levels are more 
likely to oppose proportional group representation 
in institutions not subject to guaranteed group 
representation 
n/a n/a confirmed 
H4 Groups that live territorially concentrated within a confirmed n/a n/a 
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territory and are in sole control of that territory 
are more likely to seek a greater group voice at 
the periphery 
H5 Groups that do not live territorially concentrated 
within a territory and are not in sole control of 
that territory are less likely to seek a greater group 
voice at the periphery 
n/a confirmed confirmed 
 
 
Firstly, the lack of native Amarigna might have prevented the groups from seeking a greater 
voice at the center. Additionally, it may have also played a role in the attempt to allow the 
settlers limited representation in that the Berta seemed to have fiercely opposed the said 
measure, while the group that may have to some extent exhibited the said language, the 
Shinasha, seem to have shown a greater willingness towards allowing said representation.  
 
As for the variable of education, it may have partially influenced the form of voice sought. 
The lesser-educated, numerically larger Berta, appeared to have sought group proportionality 
while the higher educated Shinasha seemed to have at least not supported the said measure. 
Finally, the territorial concentration of the Berta in combination with their exclusive control 
of their territory might have been a factor encouraging them to seek a greater group voice at 
the periphery including the seeking of an own territory. Conversely, the Gumuz and Shinasha, 
living dispersed and/or not having exclusive control of their territory appear to have displayed 
a more cooperative attitude in that they seemed to have moderated their seeking of a voice in 
the name of the group. 
 
In short, the language issue appears to have influenced all the groups to refrain from central 
voice seeking. The educational variable might to some extend have had influence on the 
seeking of proportionality. But most prominently, overruling the educational variable, the 
variable of territorial concentration in combination with exclusive control of the territory may 
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have influenced the choice of the respective groups to seek or not to seek a greater group 
voice. After this short summary, one will now turn to the conclusion. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Allowing a constitutionally guaranteed voice to different ethnic groups has been a contentious 
issue. While some argue that they can mitigate conflict and prevent a country from falling 
apart (e.g. Simeon and Conway 2001; Watts 1996; Gurr 2000) others argue that in the long-
term, they can create or maintain conflicts and are more likely to result in either the 
disaggregation of the state or the recentralization of power (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; 
Roeder 2008). In this thesis, rather than focusing on these controversies, one argued that 
constitutional arrangements alone cannot explain group behavior as each group exhibits 
distinct features influencing if, where and how voice is sought. One has therefore posed the 
question of how the social factors of language, education and territorial concentration 
influence the seeking of voice at the center and/or at the periphery.  
 
This question was asked in the context of Ethiopia with a specific focus on one of its multi-
ethnic regions, Benishangul-Gumuz by qualitatively assessing the documented evidence of 
the respective groups’ voice seeking behaviors. The analysis of the Ethiopian Constitution as 
well as the country’s distinct history implied that the selected social variables -interacting 
with the constitutional provisions of Amarigna as a central language, partially weak 
guarantees for group representation and the constitutional promise of self-rule- might 
influence the voice-seeking behavior of groups differently. 
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Firstly, it was argued that the adoption of a single official language in a multilingual context 
leads to a setting where groups speaking said language as a mother tongue might be more 
capable to participate effectively in the policy process whereas non-native speaking groups 
might experience a competitive disadvantage in said participation, thus unequal 
empowerment. The findings appear to support the hypothesis (H1) that groups that are non-
native Amarigna speakers are more likely to seek influence at the regional level in that all 
groups seemed to have focused their voice-seeking efforts on the regional level. 
 
Secondly, one argued that weak provisions towards equitable group representation in 
institutions might create an environment promoting representation and appointments by merit, 
jeopardizing the prospects of groups with lower educational levels while favoring the 
empowerment of the higher educated groups again resulting in a possible unequal 
empowerment of groups. The hypothesis that groups with lower educational levels are more 
likely to seek at least proportional group representation in central/ regional institutions not 
subject to guaranteed group representation (H2) could only partially be confirmed with the 
Gumuz -exhibiting equally low educational levels as the Berta- not making such demands. 
The actual implementation of policy by qualified personnel, possibly in the interest of all 
regional groups, might have been seen as more important than demanding proportionality. 
The third hypothesis, that groups with higher educational levels are more likely to oppose 
proportional group representation in institutions not subject to guaranteed group 
representation (H3), appears to have been confirmed, with the Shinasha at least not joining the 
Berta’s call for proportionality. 
 
A third argument made was that the expectations raised by the constitutional promise of self-
rule may diverge fundamentally depending on how concentrated a group lives and on the fact 
that they would potentially be in control of their own territory. Groups living regionally 
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dispersed and/or sharing their territory might consider a greater group voice less desirable 
than a shared voice, which they may perceive as counterproductive for the inevitable 
cooperation between the groups sharing the territory. Conversely, groups living territorially 
concentrated within a region and also potentially controlling it, may perceive that self-rule has 
not materialized to a sufficient extent and would perhaps consider a greater group voice as 
their more desirable option.  The established hypothesis (H4), that groups that live territorially 
concentrated within a territory and are in control of said territory are more likely to call for a 
greater group voice appears to have been confirmed with the Berta predominantly living in 
one zone having demanded the presidency, proportional representation, keeping out the 
settlers from representation as well as autonomy. In contrast, the Shinasha, although 
concentrated in one zone but sharing a territory with other groups and living partially 
assimilated to other groups seemed not to have made such calls. Also the Gumuz that live 
territorially dispersed over two territories refrained from making such group specific calls, 
which confirms the fifth hypothesis, namely that such groups are less likely to seek a greater 
group voice at the periphery (H5). 
 
In short, the language issue appears to have influenced all the groups to refrain from central 
voice-seeking. The educational variable might to some extend have had influence on the 
seeking of proportionality. But most prominently, overruling the educational variable, the 
variable of territorial concentration in combination with exclusive control of the territory may 
have influenced the choice of the respective groups to seek or not to seek a greater group 
voice.  
 
Thus, one could indeed argue that the groups’ distinct societal features in interaction with 
constitutional provision might influence if, where and how voice is sought. However, one 
must be careful with drawing general conclusions. The research was based on material found 
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on the behavior of the political class of said groups. As indicated earlier these individuals do 
not necessarily represent overall group interests. In addition, other variables (e.g. economic 
disparities) not taken into account in this analysis might have confounded the results. Finally, 
the findings may only apply to the specific context of Benishangul-Gumuz only. In order for 
the findings to become more generalizable they would have to be tested in other regions 
within Ethiopia as well as countries other than Ethiopia. 
 
To conclude this section, as indicated earlier in this thesis, this research was impeded by the 
incapability to conduct a field trip as well as the lack of knowledge of Amarigna. The 
research was therefore based on the relatively scarce literature and other sources found in 
English. Due to these constraints one was careful with drawing too rigorous conclusions. 
Nevertheless, the results found might have shed some light on how constitutional provisions 
of voice accommodation interact with certain societal traits and might serve as a point of 
departure for future researchers capable of conducting research in the country and in 
possession of the Amarigna language.  
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Annex 1 – Language Distributions 
Table 6 Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) > 1000: Assosa 
Rural31 
Table 7 Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) > 1000: Kemashi 
Urban 
 
Table 8 Ethnicity and Language  
population (in thousands) > 1000: Kemashi 
Urban 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 The Assosa rural population also has a relatively large (4’564) Sudanese population yet, they appear to have their own language as a 
mother tongue (BGNRS 2007).  
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